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Setting a Minimum Standard of Care in Clinical Trials: 
Human Rights and Bioethics as Complementary 
Frameworks
Fatma E. Marouf, Bryn s. esplin
Abstract
For the past few decades, there has been intense debate in bioethics about the standard of care that should 
be provided in clinical trials conducted in developing countries. Some interpret the Declaration of Hel-
sinki to mean that control groups should receive the best intervention available worldwide, while others 
interpret this and other international guidelines to mean the best local standard of care. Questions of 
justice are particularly relevant where limited resources mean that the local standard of care is no care at 
all. Introducing human rights law into this complex and longstanding debate adds a new and important 
perspective. Through non-derogable rights, including the core obligations of the right to health, human 
rights law can help set a minimum standard of care.
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Protecting human dignity and preventing 
exploitation are core concepts in both bioethics 
and human rights. In fact, the principles that 
guide biomedical research ethics were developed 
in response to specific incidents of exploitation, 
including the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Yet 
the rapid globalization of biomedical research in 
recent decades presents new challenges in preventing 
exploitation. Affluent countries and multinational 
corporations now commonly conduct clinical 
trials in developing countries, a practice known as 
“off-shoring.”1 The advantages of this practice for 
the sponsors of the trials are clear: it significantly 
reduces the cost of trials, sometimes as much as 
90%, helps avoid the increasingly bureaucratic 
regulatory environment in many wealthy countries, 
and renders legal accountability extremely unlikely.2 
However, these same factors increase the risk that 
research subjects will be exploited, especially since 
nearly half of the clinical trials in developing trials 
escape review by an ethics committee.3 
 One of the ongoing debates within bioethics 
related to the practice of “off-shoring” pertains to 
the standard of care owed to participants in clinical 
trials. Specifically, there is a dispute over when the 
use of placebo or no intervention for the control 
group is permissible. The Declaration of Helsinki, 
which provides ethical principles for medical 
research involving human subjects, generally 
requires researchers to test new interventions 
against the “best proven intervention.”4 The plain 
text of the Declaration does not clarify whether this 
means the best intervention available worldwide or 
the best intervention available locally. Some argue 
that providing the best worldwide standard of care 
is simply not feasible in developing countries and 
may obstruct important research that could improve 
health conditions in those countries. On the other 
hand, the unavailability of interventions in many 
developing countries often means the local standard 
of care is very limited or no care at all, creating a 
double standard in clinical trials involving the rich 
and the poor.5 
 In this article, we argue that international human 
rights principles are relevant to the standard of 
care debate and help define a middle ground that 
recognizes the practical challenges involved in 
providing the best worldwide intervention while 
also setting a minimum standard of care for 
control groups. Examining the standard of care issue 
through a human rights lens helps draw attention 
to the obligations of the States that both sponsor 
and host the trials, including their obligations to 
regulate corporations, rather than focusing on 
the subject-researcher relationship.6 Harnessing the 
language of human rights also helps build power 
among disadvantaged groups, which fuels advocacy 
and organizing efforts to challenge exploitation. 
Perhaps most importantly, applying complementary 
human rights principles can help provide guidance 
in situations where invoking bioethical principles 
alone leads to conflicting conclusions.7 
 Bioethics builds on the basic principles of 
autonomy, beneficence, and justice, which are 
non-hierarchical and require careful balancing of 
factors such as potential risks and benefits. Human 
rights law, on the other hand, identifies certain 
non-derogable rights from which no deviation 
is permitted, even in times of crisis. To the extent 
that hierarchy exists among human rights, these 
non-derogable rights represent the apex and cannot 
be balanced against other interests. We argue that 
these non-derogable rights, including the core 
obligations of the right to health, help establish a 
minimum standard of care for control groups in 
clinical trials. 
International guidelines on biomedical 
research: Equivocal ethics?
The debate over the standard of care in clinical 
trials intensified in the 1990s, when placebo-
controlled trials of AZT, a drug used to prevent the 
perinatal transmission of HIV, were conducted in 
numerous developing countries.8 Since effective 
Introduction
   J U N E  2 0 1 5    N U M B E R  1    V O L U M E  1 7   Health and Human Rights Journal
F. marouf, b. esplin/Health and Human Rights 17/1 (2015) 
33
alternative treatments were available at the time 
in developed countries, Lurie and Wolf critiqued 
the use of placebos in these trials, arguing that 
allowing research methods that would have been 
unacceptable in the sponsoring country created a 
double standard and imposed unnecessary risks 
to participants.9 Critics responded that the use of 
placebos was necessary to obtain scientifically valid 
results that ultimately benefited the population as a 
whole.10 The issue of when placebos are permissible 
remains unresolved today, despite international 
guidance from multiple organizations.
 One of the challenges is that different 
organizations have conflicting views. In 1949, WHO 
and UNESCO jointly established the Council for 
International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS), an international nongovernmental 
organization which in 1993 published “International 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects.” These guidelines, most 
recently updated in 2002, generally require the 
control group to receive an “established effective 
intervention” but allow for exceptions where: (1) 
there is no established effective intervention; (2) 
withholding the established effective intervention 
would expose subjects, at most, to temporary 
discomfort or delay in relief of symptoms; or (3) use 
of an established effective intervention would not 
yield scientifically reliable results and use of placebo 
would not add any risk of serious or irreversible 
harm.11 
 The commentary that explains these guidelines 
indicates certain additional conditions for invoking 
an exception.12 First, the study should be designed 
to develop an intervention for use in a country 
where an established effective intervention is 
unlikely to become widely available (or available at 
all), usually due to cost or logistics. Furthermore, 
the purpose of the study should be to make an 
effective alternative available in that country. This 
means the investigational intervention should 
respond to the health needs of the population from 
which research subjects are recruited and be made 
reasonably available to that population if it proves 
safe and effective. Finally, scientific and ethical 
review committees must determine that using an 
established effective intervention would not yield 
scientifically reliable results that would be relevant 
to the health needs of the study population. Thus, 
both benefit to the host community and scientific 
necessity are required.
 In addition to the CIOMS guidelines, there is the 
Declaration of Helsinki, which was issued by the 
World Medical Association (WMA) in 1964 and 
likely represents the most influential statement of 
ethical principles for medical research involving 
human subjects. The Declaration also tends to be 
the focus of the standard of care debate because its 
language suggests a universal standard.13 Over the 
years, the Declaration has been revised nine times, 
including multiple revisions pertaining to the 
standard of care. Since 2008, the Declaration has 
required new interventions to be tested against the 
“best proven intervention” with two exceptions.14 
The use of placebo or no intervention for the 
control group is permitted: (1) when “no proven 
intervention” exists; or (2) when there are sound 
methodological reasons to deviate from the “best 
proven intervention” and no additional risk of 
serious or irreversible harm.15 Prior versions of the 
Declaration, issued in 2002 and 2004, were more 
permissive with the use of placebos, allowing an 
exception solely for methodological reasons, but 
that triggered criticism that scientific grounds alone 
cannot determine whether the research design is 
ethical. 
 Comparing the Declaration to the CIOMS 
guidelines, it may initially appear that the 
Declaration imposes a higher standard of care 
because it requires the “best proven intervention,” 
rather than just an “established effective 
intervention.” Unfortunately, the Declaration fails 
to specify whether this “best proven intervention” 
is based on international or local availability. 
Some argue that using a worldwide standard 
would be at odds with the international consensus, 
while others dispute that any such consensus 
exists.16 Furthermore, some argue that it would be 
unreasonable to require all countries to provide 
the best worldwide standard of care, while others 
find it unreasonable to use a local standard that is 
determined largely by prices set by pharmaceutical 
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companies.17 In light of this ongoing debate, it 
remains unclear whether the Declaration’s standard 
is actually higher than the CIOMS standard. The 
Declaration also does not include the restrictions 
mentioned in the commentary on the CIOMS 
guidelines, such as benefit to the host community.
 A third organization that is more permissive with 
the use of placebos than either CIOMS or the WMA 
is the International Conference of Harmonization 
(ICH), comprised of the US, European Union, Japan, 
and experts from the pharmaceutical industry. In 
2001, the ICH adopted guidelines entitled Choice of 
Control Group and Related Issues in Clinical Trials 
(CCG).18 While the US abandoned the Declaration 
of Helsinki in 2008, it continues to endorse the CCG 
guidance, which provides only one rule restricting 
the use of placebos. The CCG states that “[i]n cases 
where an available treatment is known to prevent 
serious harm, such as death or irreversible morbidity 
in the study population, it is generally inappropriate 
to use a placebo control” (emphasis added).19 In 
other situations, “it is generally considered ethical 
to ask patients to participate in a placebo-controlled 
trial, even if they may experience discomfort as a 
result, provided the setting is noncoercive and 
patients are fully informed about available therapies 
and the consequences of delaying treatment.”20 
Thus, in trials where there is no risk of serious harm, 
placebos may be used as long as there is informed 
consent.
 As further guidance, the CCG notes, “Whether 
a particular placebo-controlled trial is ethical may 
in some cases depend on what is believed to have 
been clinically demonstrated under the particular 
circumstances of the trial,” which suggests that a trial 
may be deemed ethical in hindsight and justified 
if the overall benefit outweighs the harm involved 
in using placebos.21 The CCG also recommends 
considering modifications to the research design, 
such as “early escape” from ineffective therapy, 
a limited placebo period, or an “add-on” study, 
where the new intervention is added to standard 
treatment, as ways to reduce ethical concerns.22 
These statements reflect some recognition that 
the restriction on use of placebos only in cases of 
serious harm does not eliminate ethical concerns.
 We believe these various approaches to the 
use of placebos leave participants in developing 
countries vulnerable to exploitation for several 
reasons. First, the guidelines discussed above 
do not set any hard rules prohibiting the use of 
placebos in certain situations. Avoiding clear 
rules and relying on determinations of scientific 
necessity or benefit to the host community might 
be feasible if trial protocols received careful review, 
but many protocols in developing countries never 
come before ethics committees, as mentioned above. 
Furthermore, insofar as the guidelines permit a 
local standard of care, they fail to take into account 
the serious public health consequences of not 
providing treatment, especially for infectious and 
epidemic diseases. In addition, liberally permitting 
placebos based on the local standard of care due to 
lack of resources in the host country ignores the 
international obligations of high-income countries 
to provide assistance in improving access to health 
care in developing countries. Lastly, the international 
guidelines examined here do not mention special 
protections for particularly vulnerable populations 
as a condition of involving them in placebo-
controlled trials. 
 In light of these concerns and the persistent 
controversy surrounding the appropriate standard 
of care, we propose using human rights law as 
a complementary framework to help move the 
discussion forward. While human rights law does 
not settle the debate, it can be interpreted and 
applied in ways that help establish a minimum 
standard of care. If no such baseline of care is 
established, then when a country cracks down on 
ethical violations, clinical trials will simply move 
to another poor country with a weak regulatory 
regime. This is exactly what has happened in 
India, where clinical trials have dropped by 93% in 
response to the government’s recent efforts to stop 
unnecessary deaths.23 
A human rights approach to the standard of 
care in clinical trials
To date, international human rights bodies have 
issued only very limited guidance on the applicabil-
ity of human rights norms to clinical research trials. 
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The only major report on this topic, issued by the 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health in 2009, 
pertains to informed consent.24 This report includes 
a single sentence flagging the standard of care as 
an area of concern: “It continues to be questioned 
whether conducting clinical trials in developing 
countries can ever be considered ethical, especially 
when using placebos despite the existence of appro-
priate non-placebo interventions.”25 Recognizing the 
need for ethics review boards to “eliminate double 
standards applied to developing countries,” the 
Special Rapporteur called for “the most protective 
standards” if conducting research abroad changes 
the requirements for informed consent.26 
 Similarly, we utilize the human rights framework 
to call for protective standards when conducting 
research in a developing country changes 
requirements regarding the standard of care. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
both have provisions relevant to the standard of 
care in clinical trials. The ICCPR includes at least 
three relevant non-derogable rights: the rights 
to life, freedom from nonconsensual medical 
experimentation, and nondiscrimination. 
 In addition, the ICESCR provides a right to 
the “highest attainable standard of health,” which 
is generally subject to progressive realization 
but has certain “core obligations” that must be 
implemented immediately. In General Comment 
14, an authoritative interpretation of the right to 
health, the Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) enumerates these “core 
obligations” and explains that “a State party cannot, 
under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its 
noncompliance with the core obligations . . . which 
are non-derogable.”27 Since the core obligations of 
the right to health are non-derogable, they reflect 
the minimum core content of the right to health, the 
non-negotiable foundation of the right to which all 
individuals are entitled, regardless of the economic 
situation in a country. Such clear prioritization of 
certain aspects of the right to health is striking, 
since CESCR does not always describe the core 
obligations of a right as non-derogable.28 
 We argue that these non-derogable rights, 
including the core obligations of the right to 
health, provide guidance in setting a minimum 
standard of care for clinical trials. Although the 
concept of minimum core obligations has been 
subject to various criticisms, it remains one of the 
two main ways that tribunals approach economic 
and social rights and is therefore highly relevant.29 
Furthermore, by emphasizing the responsibilities 
of developed countries to provide assistance and 
regulate corporations, this proposal counters the 
criticism that focusing on minimum core obligations 
ignores the violations of affluent countries. 
 Since governments are the primary duty-
bearers in the international human rights system, 
one question that arises is what if the sponsor 
of the clinical trial is a non-state actor, such as a 
pharmaceutical company? General Comment 14 
helps answer these questions by emphasizing that 
“States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the 
right to health in other countries, and to prevent 
third parties from violating the right [to health] in 
other countries, if they are able to influence these 
third parties by way of legal or political means.”30 
Even more specifically, General Comment 14 
describes “the failure to regulate the activities of . . . 
corporations so as to prevent them from violating 
the right to health of others” as a violation of the 
obligation to protect.31 Thus, “Violations of the right 
to health can occur through the direct action of 
States or other entities insufficiently regulated by 
States.”32 These provisions impose a responsibility on 
States to regulate domestic and foreign clinical trials 
in ways that protect human rights. The standards 
that developed countries adopt for approving 
investigations of new drugs and marketing of drugs 
based on foreign clinical trials should be consistent 
with the core obligations of the right to health. 
Similarly, developing countries need to ensure that 
proposals to conduct clinical trials undergo close 
scrutiny by independent ethics committees that 
apply standards designed to uphold these rights.
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Deprivation of essential drugs, as defined by 
WHO 
One of the core obligations of the right to health 
is “[t]o provide essential drugs, as defined under 
WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs.”33 
This is the most well-defined core obligation, since 
it references a specific list of medications. In 1975, 
WHO defined essential drugs as “those considered 
to be of the utmost importance and hence basic, 
indispensable and necessary for the health needs 
of the population.”34 Two years later, despite major 
opposition from the pharmaceutical industry, 
WHO published its first Model List of Essential 
Drugs, which included the generic names of more 
than 200 drugs and vaccines, most of which were 
no longer protected by patents.35 The Model List has 
since been updated every two years and serves as a 
guide for countries in creating their own national 
lists. By relying on WHO’s expertise in defining this 
core obligation, CESCR stresses “the key function 
assigned to WHO is realizing the right to health.”36 
 Some commentators have critiqued the 
core obligation to provide essential drugs as 
impracticable, arguing that few states can comply 
due to resource limitations.37 One response is that 
developing countries can take certain measures that 
are inexpensive, such as removing legal barriers 
to accessing essential drugs. For example, certain 
analgesics on the list of essential drugs remain 
very difficult to access in developing countries. The 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health has noted, 
“Although the developing world has nearly half of 
the world’s cancer patients and nearly all new HIV 
infections, it consumes only 6 percent of the licit 
morphine supply.”38 In fact, “About 89 percent of all 
legally controlled medicines, including morphine, 
is consumed by North America and Europe.”39
 Another response to the criticism based on 
resource limitations is that CESCR imposes a duty 
on “States parties and other actors in a position 
to assist, to provide ‘international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and technical’ 
which enable developing countries to fulfill their 
core . . . obligations.”40 CESCR specifically provides 
that, “Depending on the availability of resources, 
States should facilitate access to essential health 
facilities, goods and services in other countries, 
wherever possible and provide the necessary aid 
when required.”41 Taking these obligations into 
consideration, we propose that the minimum 
standard of care in clinical trials should include 
providing essential drugs, as defined by WHO, to 
the control group; if the trial takes place in a country 
where the essential drug is not readily available, 
then the sponsor of the trial, which stands to reap 
the profits, should cover the cost of providing the 
essential drug. This proposal is not unprecedented. 
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies similarly advises that the sponsor 
should pay if an intervention is not available due to 
cost, and South Africa requires all participants in 
HIV vaccine research to have access to high quality 
treatment financed by the sponsors of the trials.42
 Shifting the financial burden to the sponsor of 
the trial not only challenges how core obligations 
are typically construed, but also creates an incentive 
for developed countries to support donor programs 
designed to promote access to essential drugs, for 
example through their membership in international 
financial organizations. Such action would reinforce 
CESCR’s position that “international financial 
institutions, notably the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, should pay greater 
attention to the protection of the right to health 
in their lending policies, credit agreements and 
structural adjustment programmes.”43 
 One limitation in using the WHO list of essential 
drugs to establish a minimum standard of care is 
that new drugs are not added to this list until clinical 
trials establishing their efficacy are completed. For 
example, while antiretroviral drugs for HIV are 
now included, there were no medications for HIV 
on the list in the 1990s when ethical controversies 
arose about the failure to provide HIV-positive 
control groups with any treatment.44 The principles 
proposed below help address this limitation.
Use of placebos in trials involving life-
threatening illnesses
The right to life, set forth in Article 6 of the ICCPR, 
is “the supreme right from which no derogation 
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is permitted even in time of public emergency.”45 
According to the Human Rights Committee (HRC), 
which interprets the ICCPR, the right to life should 
not be interpreted narrowly. We contend that respect 
for the right to life prohibits the use of placebos in 
trials involving treatable illnesses that may result in 
serious harm or death. This interpretation provides 
a bright-line rule, unlike the CCG guidelines, which, 
as discussed above, simply state that it is “generally 
inappropriate” to use placebos for treatable illnesses 
that may result in serious harm. 
 A more difficult question arises when there is a 
life-threatening illness with high mortality rates and 
only experimental treatments are available, as in 
the case of Ebola. All of the international bioethics 
guidelines discussed in the previous section allow 
the use of placebos where no proven treatment 
exists. Yet there is currently a heated debate over 
whether clinical trials involving Ebola interventions 
should use placebos (plus basic supportive care) for 
the control group. The US government plans to 
conduct Ebola trials with placebos, but Médecins 
Sans Frontiers, WHO, and a coalition of European 
countries have all rejected this approach, opting 
instead for trials involving multiple experimental 
interventions.46 While this specific debate is beyond 
the scope of this article, we note that even scientists 
who support the use of placebo trials for Ebola agree 
that as soon as an experimental drug shows some 
benefit, it should become the new standard of care 
for all treatment groups.47 One approach short of 
providing experimental treatments to all groups in 
such situations may be requiring the use of adaptive 
experimental designs to minimize the loss of life.48 
The CCG mentions that such “modifications” may 
help avoid ethical concerns but does not require 
them.
Use of placebos in trials involving major 
infectious, epidemic, or endemic diseases
Of “comparable priority” to the non-derogable 
core obligations are the obligations to “provide 
immunizations against major infectious diseases” 
and “take measures to prevent, treat, and control 
epidemic and endemic diseases.”49 These obligations 
reflect a public health approach, emphasizing 
the collective aspects of the right to health.50 
While the former obligation is absolute, like the 
obligation to provide essential drugs, the latter uses 
the limiting language of “taking measures.” We 
therefore approach these two obligations differently. 
Regarding trials involving immunizations for major 
infectious diseases, we take the same hard line 
that we took for essential drugs, which is that the 
sponsor should pay for the control groups to receive 
an immunization known to be safe and effective, 
rather than a placebo, if such an intervention is 
not available in the host country. With respect to 
clinical trials involving the treatment of epidemic 
and endemic disease, we adopt a more nuanced 
analysis. 
 As a precursor to this analysis, we define the 
terms “epidemic” and “endemic.” According to the 
Dictionary of Epidemiology, a disease is an “epidemic” 
when its occurrence in a given community or region 
clearly exceeds the normal expectancy, while it is 
“endemic” if constantly present within a geographic 
area or population group.51 The Encyclopedia 
Britannica further explains: 
When a disease is prevalent in an area over long 
periods of time, it is considered to be endemic in 
that area. When the prevalence of disease is sub-
ject to wide fluctuations in time, it is considered 
to be epidemic during periods of high prevalence. 
Epidemics prevailing over wide geographic areas 
are called pandemics.52 
Endemic and epidemic diseases claim countless 
lives, stifle human development, and drain health 
care systems, especially in developing countries with 
weak infrastructures. They therefore tend to be top 
priorities in setting health policies, and combating 
them is foundational to the right to health.
 If an epidemic or endemic disease can be 
treated by an essential drug or is life threatening, 
then, under the principles discussed above, the 
use of placebo would be prohibited. In other 
situations, we contend that the obligation to “take 
measures” should include, at a minimum, having 
certain protections in place if placebos are used. 
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This approach is consistent with the one taken by 
the Special Rapporteur on the right to health in 
the report on informed consent, which stressed 
that “A rights-based approach to medical research 
means that special protections must be in place to 
ensure that the autonomy of potential participants, 
particularly those from vulnerable groups, is not 
compromised as a result of power imbalances 
inherent in the research-subject relationships.”53 
 In suggesting these particular protective 
measures, we are mindful of the dearth of guidance 
from human rights bodies or courts. We therefore 
take into consideration the protections mentioned 
in the Special Rapporteur’s report on informed 
consent, as well as a 2004 article by David Wendler 
and his colleagues arguing that the default position 
of ethics review boards should be to require the 
best worldwide standard of care unless certain 
conditions are met.54 The protections we propose 
are as follows: (1) participation risks must be 
minimized, for example through adaptive research 
designs; (2) the trials must be medically necessary 
(i.e., previous research should not obviate the need 
for additional research); (3) the use of placebos must 
be scientifically necessary to answer the question 
addressed in the trial; (4) the study must address 
important health needs for the host community; 
(5) a fair level of benefit must be conferred on 
participants; and (6) participants should not be 
worse off than if the trial had not occurred. The 
investigator should bear the responsibility of 
demonstrating that all of these protections are in 
place in order to use placebos in trials involving 
epidemic or endemic diseases. 
Use of placebos with vulnerable or 
marginalized groups 
The current debate over the Ebola trials highlights 
not only conflicting views about how to handle 
pandemics when no proven intervention is available, 
but also concerns about the use of placebos with 
vulnerable groups. Clement Adebamowo, for 
example, has argued that terrified populations 
cannot be expected to give informed consent in 
the midst of a raging epidemic, especially if they 
are distrustful of health centers and aid workers.55 
In considering the use of placebos with vulnerable 
groups, we examine the interpretations of the HRC 
in General Comment 20 and relevant concluding 
observations, as well as the report on informed 
consent from the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
health. As above, we follow the Special Rapporteur’s 
lead in recommending heightened protective 
measures for the use of placebos with vulnerable 
groups. 
 Three non-derogable rights are relevant to the 
use of placebos with vulnerable groups. First, there 
is the prohibition against subjecting individuals 
to medical experimentation without their “free 
consent” under Article 7 of the ICCPR.56 Second, 
there is the core obligation of the right to health 
that requires States parties to “ensure the right of 
access to health facilities, goods and services on a 
non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable 
or marginalized groups.”57 Third, there is the non-
derogable prohibition against discrimination based 
on “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status,” which appears in both 
conventions.58 
 The HRC has interpreted “free consent” broadly 
to take into account the potential for exploitation 
or coercion. In cases where an individual’s personal 
characteristics or life situation create a serious risk 
of exploitation, the HRC has advised exclusion 
from clinical trials that may be harmful to health. 
For example, the HRC has indicated that detainees 
and prisoners “should not be subjected to any 
medical or scientific experimentation that may 
be detrimental to their health.”59 Similarly, in its 
Concluding Observations for the Netherlands, 
the HRC has opined that certain vulnerable 
populations, including minors and others who 
cannot give genuine consent, must not be subjected 
to medical experiments that do not benefit them 
directly.60 The HRC has also expressed concern 
about the US practice of allowing research to be 
“conducted on persons vulnerable to coercion 
or undue influence such as children, prisoners, 
pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or 
economically disadvantaged persons.”61 
 Critics of excluding vulnerable groups from 
   J U N E  2 0 1 5    N U M B E R  1    V O L U M E  1 7   Health and Human Rights Journal
F. marouf, b. esplin/Health and Human Rights 17/1 (2015) 
39
clinical trials contend that doing so risks undue 
paternalism, and that requiring informed consent 
with appropriate disclosure techniques and payment 
of a fair benefit provide adequate protection against 
exploitation. They further argue that exclusion 
interferes with obtaining generalizable results, and 
that “vulnerability” itself is a problematic category 
that risks over-inclusion of heterogeneous groups.62 
While these may be valid concerns, the HRC 
and the Special Rapporteur have already helped 
define certain vulnerable groups and have made 
it clear that special protections should apply. We 
therefore propose permitting the use of placebos on 
vulnerable groups in developing countries only if 
heightened protective measures are in place. These 
measures incorporate, modify, and add to the ones 
mentioned above in order to take into account 
concerns regarding vulnerable populations. 
 Specifically, we incorporate the protections 
requiring the sponsor to demonstrate that 
participation risks are minimized, the trials 
are medically necessary, the use of placebos is 
scientifically necessary, and the participants are not 
worse off than if the trial had not been conducted. 
In addition, drawing on the Special Rapporteur’s 
report, we propose that the investigators should 
demonstrate that: (1) no comparably effective 
alternative research population is available; (2) the 
study addresses important health needs for the 
vulnerable groups, not just the host community 
in general; (3) the benefit provided is fair but 
incentives are limited to adequate compensation 
for time, effort, and any adverse consequences of 
participation; and (4) efforts have been made to 
involve a representative organization that can assist 
participants throughout the process.63 
 We do not go as far as prohibiting the participation 
of vulnerable groups, as this could be considered 
discriminatory, both because of the exclusion itself 
and because such exclusion creates a knowledge 
gap regarding the efficacy of an intervention for 
that group. However, differential treatment is 
permissible under the human rights conventions as 
long as the justification is compatible with the nature 
of those conventions and solely for the purpose 
of promoting the general welfare.64 Requiring the 
protective measures mentioned above falls within 
this permissible zone of differential treatment. 
Enforcement
One advantage of using human rights norms to 
set a minimum standard of care in clinical trials is 
that these norms may be enforceable in developing 
countries where ethical regulations of such trials 
are inadequate or nonexistent. Violations of human 
rights during clinical trials could also be brought 
before human rights bodies with individual 
complaint procedures, such as the HRC and CESCR, 
creating additional avenues for accountability. 
Of course, in some countries—most notably the 
US—human rights norms are extremely difficult 
to enforce. The US does not consider the ICCPR 
self-executing and has not ratified the ICESCR. In 
addition, the US Supreme Court held in 2013 that 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, which had been used 
to sue corporations for human rights violations 
abroad, does not apply extraterritorially.65 In such 
situations, effective regulations that prevent human 
rights violations from happening in the first place 
are especially critical. 
 The existence of extensive regulations does 
not necessarily mean that they effectively prevent 
exploitation. The detailed regulations issued by 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for 
example, do not require Investigational New Drug 
(IND) applications for foreign clinical trials.66 
Although the regulations do generally require 
evidence that foreign clinical trials conform to 
“good clinical practice” for the data to be used to 
support marketing approval or IND applications, 
the FDA has the authority to waive that requirement, 
including review and approval by an independent 
ethics committee.67 Furthermore, the regulations 
describing the requirements for obtaining 
marketing approval based solely on foreign clinical 
data provide that “FDA will apply this policy in a 
flexible manner,” again permitting deviation from 
the standards.68 Making matters worse, while the 
FDA is allowed to perform on-site inspections for 
foreign trials, it rarely does so.69 In fact, a study by 
the Office of the Inspector General found that the 
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FDA inspected less than one percent of foreign 
clinical trial sites in 2008.70 
 Oversight and accountability could be improved 
across the board through the creation of an 
international body that could review controversial 
protocols for clinical trials before they begin, 
as well as hear complaints that arise during or 
after a trial. This body should include experts 
in both bioethics and human rights, thereby 
developing complementary standards. Among 
other things, such a mechanism could explore how 
the international obligation to provide assistance 
under human rights treaties relates to the standard 
of care in clinical trials. Like the duty to provide a 
benefit in bioethics, the obligation to assist under 
human rights law need not be limited to paying for 
a treatment but could also include paying royalties 
generated from the sale of a drug or a fixed amount 
based on the principle of proportionality.71 By 
applying human rights norms to specific situations 
in biomedical research, an international body would 
also help develop the content of core obligations.
Conclusion
Bioethics and human rights are both predicated 
upon the desire to protect individual freedoms, 
promote justice, prohibit exploitation, and ensure 
human dignity. The notion of drawing on human 
rights norms to analyze the appropriate standard 
of care in clinical trials should not, therefore, be 
surprising. The real surprise is how little human 
rights bodies have thus far engaged dilemmas in 
clinical research aside from informed consent. 
The framework we propose here of applying non-
derogable rights, including the core obligations of 
the right to health, to establish a minimum standard 
of care for clinical trials represents an initial step 
in that direction. Certainly, neither bioethics nor 
human rights has resolved internal tensions about 
universality versus relativity. Furthermore, some 
may dispute the usefulness of core obligations or 
disagree about the particular protective measures 
proposed here. Such critiques are vital to the 
discussion and will help deepen our thinking about 
concepts in both fields. 
 While this article primarily addresses the 
standard of care debate, the promise of collaboration 
between the two disciplines extends much further. 
In order to make a meaningful difference in the 
protection of all human subjects, bioethics must 
strive to prevent the conditions in which individuals 
are systematically made vulnerable to exploitation. 
Adopting a human rights perspective is consistent 
with developments in public health ethics and 
global health ethics, which seek to address the 
larger social, political, and economic forces behind 
the increasing inequities in global health—perhaps 
the greatest ethical dilemma of all. 
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